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h i g h l i g h t s
• We study level-k reasoning and learning in a repeated 11–20 game.
• We also examine level-k reasoning with and without time pressure.
• Behavior is robust to repetition, which means that no learning is observed.
• Under time pressure, choices are indistinguishable from the Nash equilibrium.
• Without time pressure, this is not the case.
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a b s t r a c t
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just
like them,we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from that in equilibrium
play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions; hence there is, at best, little learning.
However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to that in equilibrium play. We
argue that time pressure evokes intuitive reasoning and reduces the focal attraction of choosing higher
(and per se more profitable) numbers in the game.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. -1. Introduction
In a recent paper, Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) — henceforth,
AR — introduced a new two-player game, called the 11–20 money
request game. This game can be regarded as a useful tool to ex-
plaining behavior and is related to the prominent concept of level-k
reasoning, whichwas introduced by Stahl andWilson (1994, 1995)
and Nagel (1995).1 In general, the letter k denotes the steps (or
depth) of reasoning of a particular subject when facing a strate-
gic problem. Therefore, a level-0 type is a non-strategic decision
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +43 512 5077163.
E-mail address: florian.lindner@uibk.ac.at (F. Lindner).
1 For an up-to-date account of models of strategic thinking, see Crawford et al.
(2013).
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Open access under CC BY-NCmaker who randomizes over the available strategies. In contrast,
the behavior of a level-k type (Lk), for any k = 1, is a best response
to the belief that other players are a level k − 1 type. This implies
that level-kmodels feature (i) an L0 behavior, which is the starting
point for iterative reasoning, and (ii) a distribution of types.
The 11–20 money request game of AR is a simultaneous move
game in which two players request a number of points between
11 and 20, which they receive for sure. One player may receive 20
extra points if he/she requests one point less than the other player
does.2 This very simple and straightforward game has a number
of notable features that make it suitable for studying level-k rea-
soning (see AR for an elaborate discussion). Compared to many
2 AR also describe two variations of this game — the Cycle Version and the
Costless Iterations Version — and in Arad and Rubinstein (2012b) they discuss
another version (the 91–100 game). These variations show very similar results to
the basic game that we are going to investigate in our paper.
ND license. 
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Relative frequencies of actions in different treatments.
Action 11 (%) 12 (%) 13 (%) 14 (%) 15 (%) 16 (%) 17 (%) 18 (%) 19 (%) 20 (%) N
Equilibrium 25 25 20 15 10 5
AR (2012) 4 0 3 6 1 6 32 30 12 6 108
BASE 1 3 4 6 3 6 20 38 14 6 80
BASE-T 4 1 1 8 6 5 15 34 19 8 80
TIME 3 3 11 5 20 5 18 17 11 8 65games, like the beauty-contest game or normal-form games, ac-
tions in the 11–20 game create no payoff externalities, for which
reason social preferences become unimportant and negligible. The
level-0 type specification is appealing, as choosing 20 is (the most
profitable) anchor for an iterative reasoning process. Furthermore,
best-responding is straightforward, as it requires undercutting the
other player by one unit.
The game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, but a mixed-
strategy equilibrium in which the strategies from 15 to 20 are cho-
sen with positive probabilities (see Table 1). In their paper, AR find
that experimental play is significantly different from equilibrium
play, and that the level of reasoning is fairly limited, with subjects
typically not choosing more than three steps of reasoning.3
In this paper, we study behavior in the 11–20 game by consider-
ing (i) whether time pressure has an effect on experimental (equi-
librium) play and (ii) whether subjects converge to equilibrium
with repetition. The second question touches upon learning. Pre-
vious work on level-k reasoning in beauty-contest games (Nagel,
1995; Ho et al., 1998), for instance, has shown that repeated
choices converge towards the equilibrium solution (even if the
level of reasoning from one period to the next does not increase).
So far, the 11–20 game has not been played in a repeated-game
setting, and hence we test the robustness of the one-shot findings
of AR. The first question is related to a growing body of literature
which is interested in how time pressure affects economic decision
making (see Kocher et al., forthcoming for a recent contribution
and a brief review of economic literature on the topic). Since many
important decisions — e.g., last-minute bidding in auctions (Roth
and Ockenfels, 2002), bargaining decisions (Sutter et al., 2003), or
decisions in financialmarkets—have to bemade under severe time
pressure, it is important to understand whether economic behav-
ior changes in such a stressful environment. An earlier contribution
of Kocher and Sutter (2006) on the effects of time pressure in the
beauty-contest game has shown that time pressure dampens the
speed with which choices converge to the equilibrium (of choos-
ing zero). As argued above (andmore extensively in AR), the 11–20
game provides a much simpler setting to study level-k reasoning
than the beauty-contest game, and hence we are interested in the
effects of time pressure in such an environment.
2. Experimental design
Our experiment consists of two parts. Part one is a one-shot ver-
sion of the 11–20 game (the rules of which have been introduced
above; see the online supplement (Appendix) for experimental in-
structions). Part one has three different treatments, explained be-
low. Part two is a five-fold repetition of the 11–20 game with the
same partner (fixed partner matching, where partners differ from
part one, though). It is explained only after the conclusion of part
one, and no feedback about part one is given until thewhole exper-
iment is finished. Part two is identical in all experimental sessions
and has no treatment variations.
3 This feature of limited levels of reasoning is strongly reminiscent of findings
for the beauty-contest game (see Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006 or
Grosskopf and Nagel, 2008) or normal-form games (Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker,
2008; Danz et al., 2012).The first treatment in part one,BASE, is a replication of the basic
version of AR. The second treatment, BASE-T, is a modification
of BASE in order to make it comparable to the third treatment,
TIME. In the treatment with time pressure, TIME, we explain only
the basic features of the game in the instructions, i.e., that it is a
two-person game, that subjects will be able to choose a number
from an interval that will be disclosed when the experiment starts,
that subjects earn the amount of points equivalent to the chosen
number, and that subjectsmay earn 20 bonus points under specific
conditions. The details — that the interval was [11, 20] and that
20 bonus points could be earned if one player’s number was one
unit below the other player’s number — are only disclosed when
the experiment starts and subjects have only 15 s time to read this
information and make a choice. If these details had been disclosed
before the start of the experiment, it would not have been possible
to implement time pressure, because subjects would have had
the chance to make up their mind while the experiment was still
explained.
In order to have a comparison treatment thatmimics TIME as far
as possible, we implement our second treatment, BASE-T, which is
identical to TIME, except that subjects have 3 min time — instead
of 15 s — to read the information on the first screen and enter their
decision.4
After part one, subjects in all three treatments are told that this
game (with the same rules as in treatment BASE) is played for five
more periods in partner matching, with 3 min time for making
decisions in each period, and with feedback after each period. We
denote the data in the repetition asR-BASE,R-BASE-T, andR-TIME
to identify which treatment subjects have had in part one.
We have four sessions with 20 subjects each for each of the
three treatments (using zTree Fischbacher, 2007, and ORSEE,
Greiner, 2004). This yields 80 subjects per treatment, and a total
of 240 participants. Experiments were conducted at the University
of Innsbruck using a standard subject pool across all disciplines. In
our sample, 52% of participants were female. On average, subjects
earned 7.90 Euros.
3. Results
3.1. Part one — one-shot game
In treatment TIME, 65 out of 80 subjects were able to make a
decision within the time constraint (the 15 remaining subjects did
not receive any payment for part one; we also exclude their data in
the analysis of part two below). Table 1 presents in the first row the
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium distribution (assuming that
players maximize the expected monetary payoff). In the second
row, we show the data of AR for comparison reasons; and below
we present the data of our three treatments.
Recall that BASE is a replication of AR. While the data look
slightly different, there is no significant difference between AR and
4 Treatment BASE-T was run immediately before treatment TIME. In Treatment
BASE-T, 15% of subjects entered a decisionwithin 15 s. For this reason, we restricted
the available decision time in treatment TIME to 15 s, which should guarantee a
highly demanding time pressure.
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Actions in the repeated game.
Action 11 (%) 12 (%) 13 (%) 14 (%) 15 (%) 16 (%) 17 (%) 18 (%) 19 (%) 20 (%) N
Equilibrium 25 25 20 15 10 5
R-BASE 0 1 2 2 7 11 20 24 21 13 400
R-BASE-T 1 3 2 4 8 9 21 22 18 12 400
R-TIME 3 3 3 5 8 11 18 24 12 13 325BASE (p = 0.46;χ2-test), indicating thatwe are able to confirm the
data of AR. Furthermore, BASE is not significantly different from
BASE-T (p = 0.84;χ2-test), showing that the different presen-
tation of the game does not make a difference. Both treatments,
BASE and BASE-T, are significantly different from that in equilib-
rium play, though (p < 0.01;χ2-tests), again confirming AR.
In contrast to these findings, the results in TIME look markedly
different. With time pressure, the distribution of chosen actions
shifts leftward. It is significantly different from that in BASE-T (p =
0.025;χ2-test). It is also no longer significantly different from that
in equilibrium play (p = 0.18;χ2-test). One might think that the
latter result would be a consequence of random play in TIME —
given the demanding environment — but this is not the case, since
thedistribution of choices is significantly different from that in ran-
dom play (p < 0.01;χ2-tests).5 Rather, we see that less time leads
to a lower frequency of sophisticated choices 17–19, and that the
choice of 15 (in themiddle of the range) becomes fairly prominent.
We summarize this subsection as follows.
Result 1. Time pressure leads to a situation where subjects’ strat-
egy choices correspond — perhaps coincidentally — more closely
to those in equilibrium play compared to a situation without time
constraints.
3.2. Part two — five-fold repetition of the game
Table 2 presents the relative frequency of chosen actions across
all five periods, and Fig. 1 shows the average chosen number in
each of the five periods of part two (and the average in part one).
Recall that part twowas identical in all sessions and thus did not in-
volve any time pressure. The data in Table 2 show that all three dis-
tributions are significantly different from that of equilibrium play
(p < 0.01;χ2-tests). Hence, without any time pressure, numbers
go up again, as can also be seen in Fig. 1. Interestingly, the expo-
sure to time pressure in part one (in TIME) has an enduring effect
on part two insofar as the chosen numbers in part two are signif-
icantly smaller in R-TIME than in R-BASE-T (which is the proper
comparison), as becomes clear from a regression not reported here
(p = 0.002). Table 3 presents pairwise comparisons of the three
treatments for each period separately. In periods one, two, and five
there is no statistical difference in any of the treatment compar-
isons. We find significant differences in two out of three pairwise
comparisons in period three and in all comparisons in period four.6
Overall, Fig. 1 suggests that repetition does not lead to convergence
towards the equilibrium distribution of actions, showing that the
one-shot results established in AR are robust to potential learning
effects when repeating the task.
Result 2. Behavior in the 11–12 game is robust over periods, i.e.
the game is rather stable against learning issues and experience of
different one-shot treatments.
5 Another way to look at the possibility that random play might partly drive our
results is to assume that half of participants choose strategies according to the Nash
equilibrium and half play random strategies. This would lead to a 5–5–5–5–17.5–
17.5–15–12.5–10–7.5 distribution of choices from 11 to 20. The result of a χ2-test
shows that we can only reject the hypothesis that subjects behave this way on a
15% significance level (p = 0.15).
6 More details are presented in Table A in the online supplement (Appendix).Table 3
Pairwise comparisons of treatments by period with Fisher’s exact tests (p-values).
Period in part
two
R-BASE versus
R-BASE-T
R-BASE versus
R-TIME
R-BASE-T
versus
R-TIME
Period 1 0.43 0.18 0.33
Period 2 0.42 0.58 0.54
Period 3 0.05 0.16 0.00
Period 4 0.02 0.00 0.02
Period 5 0.41 0.42 0.19
Fig. 1. Average actions per period in part two.
4. Conclusion
We have been able to replicate the results of Arad and Rubin-
stein (2012a) on behavior in a novel two-person game that allows
studying strategic behavior. The level of reasoning has been fairly
limited, and the overall behavior diverges considerably from that
of equilibrium play. This is also true when the game is repeated,
which is the first and main contribution of our paper, indicating
that behavior is robust against learning. The finding that no ‘‘ad-
justment’’ of level-0 types took place in later rounds is quite sur-
prising, andmight be further explored in future research. However,
and this is the second contribution of our paper, introducing time
pressure in the 11–20 game has shifted behavior in the direction
of (mixed-strategy) equilibrium, although the shift may be coinci-
dental. Decisions that are made faster are described by Rubinstein
(2007) as intuitive. In contrast, cognitive decisions require more
time, which might lead subjects in the 11–20 game to be attracted
by the higher sure payoffs the longer they think about the game.
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